Apparently, a universal "is" also presents a problem for formal logic, and according to Rota's account of Heidegger, we want instead to replace it with a universal "as".
Three Senses of "A is B" in Heidegger
It may be helpful to subdivide Heidegger's view of "A is B" into three stages. However, such a subdivision is no more than a rhetorical device. The development of a person's thought refuses linearization.
The tradition of philosophy constrains us to use words like "problems", "solutions", "arguments", "and "relationships". There is at present no alternative to this language. Heidegger attempted to develop a language which he considered more appropriate, and time will tell whether his lead can be followed.
The first stage of Heidegger's reflection on language¹ is contemporary with the forward leap in logic that began with the work of Frege and the symbolic notation invented by Peano at the turn of the century. Young Heidegger's book reviews shared the enthusiasm for the new logic. At last logic could claim to have risen again to the level of Duns Scotus.
By accident, Heidegger received his training in scholastic logic. Even if Heidegger had been a student of Frege, his critique of logic would not be different. Scholastic logic and mathematical logic have similar objectives. They are logics of objectivity, founded on those assumptions that the later Heidegger summarized in the word
Gestell.
Together with the success of the new logic came its end. As the program of the predicate calculus was completed, the hidden assumptions lying beneath formal logic became apparent. The program of formalization that began with Aristotle and that concluded with Frege ignores the ur-problem of the
copula, namely, the problem of the meaning of the word
is in the statement "A is B". Short of assuming the identity of A and B, an assumption that is belied by our use of two distinct letters, "A" and "B", it is inconceivable how "A" can
be something other than itself.
The last philosopher to give serious thought to this problem prior to Heidegger was Hegel. Heidegger, however, chose not to deal with the heritage of Hegel, and followed instead the method of phenomenology inaugurated by Husserl. Thus began the second stage of Heidegger's reflection on "A is B".
Husserl's philosophy may be labelled
"salus ex descriptione." Husserl was aware of the problem of the copula, but with characteristic reluctance he does not stage a frontal assault. Instead, he uses the problem as a motivation for a milder critique of logic.
After its symbolic rewriting in the language of set theory, logic reduced the interpretations of
is in the sentence "A is B" to one of only two senses: either as "A is contained in B" or as "A is a member of B", where A and B are sets. Husserl uncovered other relationships between A and B which he proved not to be reducible to containment or membership of sets. He laid bare the underlying assumptions of formal logic by showing that logic gives favored treatment to two relations while ignoring all other relations, some of which deserve to be made rigorous. It was Husserl's intention to enlarge logic by
formalizing new relationships, although it is not clear what Husserl intended by "formalization."
Heidegger took advantage of Husserl's spadework² to develop a new language designed for an attack on the foundational problems of logic. He made use of Husserl's discovery of new relations in a more radical way than his teacher may have wished. One such is singled out as fundamental: the relation of
Fundierung. In his Third Logical Investigation, Husserl had foreshadowed the central role of
Fundierung, but he did not go far enough in implementing his discovery.
Heidegger's argument leads to the dissolution of the problem of the copula as well as to the discovery of the conditions of possibility of
Fundierung. A stereotyped summary might go as follows.
As I speak to you, you listen to me through sounds which somehow make sense. The sense of my words is not the same as the sound. Sense and sound are related by a
Fundierungszusammenhang. Husserl gave an incisive description of
Fundierungszusammenhang, the upshot of which is to prove that the relations of membership and containment are subordinate to the primitive relation of
Fundierung.
Heidegger shows that the conditions of possibility of
Fundierung can be found only if
Fundierung is viewed as a special (ontic) instances of some universal (ontological) problem. The
Zusammenhang between A and B is a problem only when the phenomena of
Fundierung and "A is B" will be special instances. Where shall we find the betokening of such universality? We will find it when we place
Fundierung and the "is" in parallel with other phenomena which will all be seen as instances of one and the same universal concept.
Descartes had seen the problem of the
is in "A is B" as an impenetrable mystery. Heidegger does not attempt to to dispel the mystery. Instead, he shows that Descartes' mystery is "the same" mystery as several others, for example, the mystery of
Fundierung, because of the prejudice that the two mysteries of the
is and of the
"Fundierungszusammenhang" are of a different kind. But what if we realized that the mystery is the condition of possibility of
all "relationships?" Then the mysteries would reduce to one single mystery, namely the condition of possibility of "relationships." But a universal mystery is no different from a universal law. Heidegger concludes with the discovery of the universal law of the
as.
The universal
as is given various names in Heidegger's writings: it will be the primordial
Nicht between beings and Being, the ontological difference, the Beyond, the primordial
es gibt, the
Ereignis.
The discovery of the universal
as is Heidegger's contribution to philosophy.³
Heidegger's later thought in no way alters this discovery. He came to believe that the language of phenomenology, in which his middle writings are couched, was inadequate to his discovery. The later Heidegger wanted to recast his discovery in a non-objectivistic language, since the universal
as lies beyond objectivity. The universal "as" is the surgence of sense in Man, the shepherd of Being.
The disclosure of the primordial
as is the end of a search that began with Plato, followed a long route through Descartes, Leibniz, Kant, Vico, Hegel, Dilthey and Husserl. This search comes to its conclusion with Heidegger.
[1] Martin Heidegger,
Gesamtausgabe, Band 1,
Frühe Schriften, Klostermann, Frankfurt am Main, 1978, p. 42 and p.174
[2] Martin Heidegger,
Gesamtausgabe, Band 2,
Sein und Zeit, Klostermann, Frankfurt am Main, 1977
[3] Martin Heidegger,
Gesamtausgabe, Band 65,
Beiträge zur Philosophie, Klostermann, Frankfurt am Main, 1989