Ugh, we’ve been over this ground many times before.
Just so you know, when I’ve criticized you in the past for, whatever I can’t remember, and you’ve responded by criticizing me for having unrealistic conceptions of objectivity, this is precisely what I have actually been advocating:
That is, I’ve advocated recognition that there’s no such thing as a view from nowhere, as Thomas Nagel put it, and that, in light of that, one should aspire to understand the assumptions that leads one to one’s convictions, even if they aren’t fully knowable, as well as the assumptions of others.
Anyway, back to Yang: I haven’t seen Yang ever claim to be “objective” and I’d be surprised to see him say that about himself, so I don’t think your point really holds.
But another thing. I’ll admit that I took a misstep in the conversation. Going back to my original comment about Yang’s manner of arriving at policy positions, it was a bit of a rabbit hole talking about whether there is an ideology undergirding his worldview (if those two things aren’t merely synonymous). The distinction I was making doesn’t really rest on whether his views are ideological or not ideological, because I accept that, defined in a certain way, ideology can simply be any set of assumptions that guides how one interprets and reasons about information. And since nothing is merely “given” to consciousness, that can include literally every aspect of thought, according to a most comprehensive definition. (I suspect, though, that ideology generally has some kind of normative component too, where the assumptions must manipulate information with a view towards some conception of how things ought to be. That is, Ideology is rarely value-neutral, I suspect.)
But when I said that Yang’s policy prescriptions are more empirical than ideological (can’t see the precise wording now as I’m on my phone), I suppose what I meant, if I could move away from those more abstract ideas about the nature of ideology, is that he, in general, doesn’t begin with either of the two sets of commitments that conventionally define each of the Republican and Democratic parties, (many of which are commitments to policies,) and he’s is willing to rethink them from the ground up, based on a line of argument that is fundamentally empirical, rather than one which is based on a story, or a conception of what it means to be a good Democrat or Republican or American, or on an emotional appeal or on a conception of what’s moral, or on a conception of rights, or whatever else. (Although he also has stories, e.g., the story about automation being instigating a new industrial revolution that will bring social unrest.) As I said, bracketing whether the data is right or the conclusions he arrives at are sound, I just admire that you can reason with him when he gives justifications for his policies, because he has a problem-solution oriented way of reasoning. The result is that Yang’s policy prescriptions are often unconventional, and break with the orthodoxies of the two parties. (Which is not to say that there aren’t ideological commitments governing his thought, just that, at least in certain respects, his thought is unconventional.)
Not to mention there’s the aspect of politics where politicians are simply fishing around for what’s popular, and that forms the basis of their justification advocating a certain policy (take, for example, the debate about minimum wage in the 2016 primaries.) Of course he’s not entirely immune to that. (I suspect that’s partially behind his support for Medicare for all.) But I suspect the empirical nature of his thought makes him a little more inflexible.